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Abstract We obtain the conditions for the emergence of the swarm
intelligence effect in an interactive game of restless multi-armed bandit
(rMAB). A player competes with multiple agents. Each bandit has a pay-
off that changes with a probability pc per round. The agents and player
choose one of three options: (1) Exploit (a good bandit), (2) Innovate
(asocial learning for a good bandit among nI randomly chosen bandits),
and (3) Observe (social learning for a good bandit). Each agent has two
parameters (c, pobs) to specify the decision: (i) c, the threshold value for
Exploit, and (ii) pobs, the probability for Observe in learning. The pa-
rameters (c, pobs) are uniformly distributed. We determine the optimal
strategies for the player using complete knowledge about the rMAB. We
show whether or not social or asocial learning is more optimal in the
(pc, nI) space and define the swarm intelligence effect. We conduct a
laboratory experiment (67 subjects) and observe the swarm intelligence
effect only if (pc, nI) are chosen so that social learning is far more optimal
than asocial learning.
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§1 Introduction
The trade-off between the exploitation of good choices and the explo-
ration of unknown but potentially more profitable choices is a well-known prob-
lem 6, 10, 5). A multi-armed bandit (MAB) provides the most typical environment
for studying this trade-off. It is defined by sequential decision making among
multiple choices that are associated with a payoff. The MAB problem involves
the maximization of the total reward for a given period or budget. In a variety
of circumstances, exact or approximated optimal strategies have been proposed
2, 7, 11, 1, 13).
Recently, the MAB has also provided a good environment for the trade-
off between social and asocial learning 10). Here, social learning is learning
through observation or interaction with other individuals, and asocial learning
is individual learning 8, 10, 6, 12). The advantage of social learning is its cost
compared with asocial learning. The disadvantage is its error-prone nature, as
the information obtained by social learning might be outdated or inappropriate.
In order to clarify the optimal strategy in the environment with the two trade-
offs, Rendell et al. held a computer tournament using a restless multi-armed
bandit (rMAB) 10). Here, restless means that the payoff of each bandit changes
over time. There are 100 bandits in an rMAB, and each bandit has a distinct
payoff independently drawn from an exponential distribution. The probability
that a payoff changes per round is pc. An agent has three options for each
round: Innovate, Observe, and Exploit. Innovate and Observe correspond to
asocial and social learning, respectively. For Innovate, an agent obtains the
payoff information of one randomly chosen bandit. For Observe, an agent obtains
the payoff information of nO randomly chosen bandits that were exploited by
the agents during the previous round. Compared to the information obtained
by Innovate, that obtained by Observe is older by one round. For Exploit, an
agent chooses a bandit that he has already explored by Innovate or Observe and
obtains a payoff. In an rMAB environment, it is extremely difficult for agents to
optimize their choices 9, 10). The outcome of the tournament was that the winning
strategies relied heavily on social learning. This contradicted previous studies
in which the optimal strategy is a mixed one that relies on some combination of
social and asocial learning. In the tournament, the cost for Observe was not very
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low, as approximately 50% of the choices of Observe returns information that
the agents already knew. The results of the tournament imply the inadvertent
filtering of information when an agent chooses Observe, as the agents choose the
best bandit during Exploit.
In this paper, we discuss whether social or asocial learning is optimal in
an rMAB, where a player competes with many agents. We answer to the question
why social learning is so adaptive in Rendell’s tournament. We suppose that the
cost of Innovate becomes higher than that of Observe in the tournament. In order
to reduce the cost of Innovate, we control the exploration range nI for Innovate,
and agents obtain the best information about the bandits among nI randomly
chosen bandits. An rMAB is characterized by two parameters, pc and nI . We
compare the average payoffs of the optimal strategies when only Innovate, only
Observe, and both are available for learning using the complete knowledge of an
rMAB and the information of the bandits exploited by agents. We determine
the region in which each type of learning is optimal in the (nI , pc) plane and
show that Observe is more adaptive than Innovate for nI = 1. We define the
swarm intelligence effect as the increase in the average payoff compared with
the payoffs of the optimal strategies where only asocial learning is available. We
have conducted a laboratory experiment where 67 human subjects competed
with multiple agents in an rMAB. If the parameters are chosen in the region
where social learning is far more optimal than asocial learning, we observe the
swarm intelligence effect.
§2 Restless multi-armed bandit interactive game
An interactive rMAB game is a game in which a player competes with
120 agents using an rMAB. The player aims to maximize the total payoff over
103 rounds and obtain a high ranking among all entrants. Below, we term the
population of all agents and a player as all entrants. The rMAB has N =
100 bandits, and we label them as n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N = 100}. Bandit n has a
distinct payoff s(n), and we term the (n, s(n)) pair as bandit information. s(n)
is an integer drawn at random from an exponential distribution (λ = 1; values
were squared and rounded to give integers mostly falling in the range of 0–10
10)). We denote the probability function for s(n) as Pr(s(n) = s) = P (s) (left
figure in Figure 1). We write the expected value of s(n) as E(S(n)), and it is
approximately 1.68. The payoff of each bandit changes independently between
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Fig. 1 Left: Plot of P (s). The expected value of s is E(s) ≃ 1.68. Right: Parameter
assignment for agent i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 120}. pobs(i) = 0.1 × (i%10) ∈ {0.0, 0.1, · · · , 0.9}. c(i) =
i/10 + 1 ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 12}.
rounds with a probability pc, with new payoff drawn at random from the same
distribution.
Every entrant has his own repertoire and can store at most three pieces
of bandit information. The bandit information has a time stamp when the
entrant obtains it. The time stamp is updated when the entrant obtains new
bandit information about the bandit. When an entrant obtains more than three
pieces of bandit information, the one with the oldest time stamp is erased from
the repertoire.
There are three possible moves for the entrants: Innovate, Observe,
and Exploit. Innovate and Observe are learning processes to obtain bandit
information. Exploit is the exploitation process that obtains some payoff.
• Innovate is individual learning, and an entrant obtains bandit informa-
tion. nI bandits are chosen at random among N = 10
2 bandits, and the
bandit information with the maximum payoff is provided to the entrant.
If there are several bandits with the same maximum payoff, one of them
is chosen at random.
• Observe is social learning, and an entrant obtains the bandit information
exploited by an agent during the previous round. If there are many agents
who exploited a bandit, an agent is randomly chosen among them, and
its bandit information is provided to the entrant. If there are no such
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agents, no bandit information is provided. The information obtained by
Observe is one round older than that obtained by Innovate.
• Exploit is the exploitation of a bandit. An entrant chooses a bandit from
his repertoire and exploits the bandit. Even if the bandit information is
(n, s(n)), as the information changes with a probability pc per round, he
does not necessarily receive the payoff s(n).
The repertoire is updated after a move. For Innovate, the bandit in-
formation with the maximum payoff sI among nI randomly chosen bandits is
provided to the entrant. We denote the distribution function of sI as PI(s) =
Pr(sI = s). Intuitively, sI is chosen in the region of upper probability 1/nI of
P (s). We denote the expectation value of sI as E(sI). If nI > 1, E(sI) > E(s)
holds. For example, E(sI) ≃ 9.63 for nI = 10. By controlling nI , we can change
the cost of Innovate.
2.1 Agent strategy
We explain the strategy of the agents. The most important factor in
the performance of the strategies in Rendell’s tournament was the proportion
of Observe in learning 10). The high performance of Observe originated from
the inadvertent filtering of bandit information, as the agents exploited the best
bandit in their repertoires. If the agents choose at random, Observe does not
provide good bandit information. We take these facts into account and introduce
a simple strategy for the agents with two parameters c and pobs.
• c: every agent has a threshold value c. If there is no bandit in one’s
repertoire whose payoff is greater than c, the agent will learn by Innovate
or Observe.
• pobs: an agent chooses Observe with a probability pobs when he learns.
We label 120 agents as i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , I = 120}. Agent i has the param-
eters (c(i), pobs(i)). c(i) is given as the quotient i/10 plus one. pobs(i) is the
remainder of i%10 multiplied by 0.1. The assignment of (c, pobs) to agent i is
represented in the right figure in Figure 1.
2.2 Game environment
A player participated in a game and competed with N agents. However,
the game did not advance on a real-time basis. Agents had already participated
in the game for 1000 rounds. When a player participated in the game, 103
sequential rounds were randomly chosen from the 1000 rounds, and he competed
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Fig. 2 The interactive rMAB game online interface. A human player is presented with
the present round t/100, his ranking among 121 entrants (one player and 120 agents), and
his repertoire. He must choose one among Innovate, Exploit a bandit, and Observe. In his
repertoire, only (n, s(n)) is shown. The bandit information from left to right indicates the
newest to oldest information, respectively.
with agents for 103 rounds. We denote the round by t ∈ {−2,−1, 0, 1, 2, · · · , T =
100}. The scores of the player and agents were set to zero. The agents had
already stored at most three pieces of bandit information in their repertoires.
The player had three rounds to learn the rMAB. He could choose Innovate or
Observe for three rounds and stored at most three pieces of bandit information
in his repertoire. After three rounds, the rMAB game started. As the agents had
already finished the game, they could not observe the information of the player.
On the other hand, the player could observe the information of the agents.
The game environment was constructed as a website. The information
of the agents for 1000 rounds was stored in a database of the website. The player
used a tablet (7 inch) and participated in the game through a web browser. The
player had to learn for three rounds and stored at most three pieces of bandit
information in his repertoire. Afterwards, the game started. Figure 2 shows the
interface of the rMAB game. For the present round t, the ranking and score
are shown on the screen. The player had to choose an action among Innovate,
Exploit, and Observe. For Exploit, the player had to choose which bandit he
would exploit in his repertoire. Then, the payoff and new ranking were shown
on the screen, and the game proceeded to the next round.
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For the parameters (nI , pc) of the rMAB, we adopted the next four
combinations. We call the combinations A, B, C, and D.
A: (nI , pc) = (1, 0.1). pc is small and the change in the payoff of a bandit is
slow. As nI = 1, E(sI) = E(s), and it is difficult to find a bandit with
high payoff with Innovate.
B: (nI , pc) = (10, 0.1). pc is small, as in A. As nI = 10, E(sI) ≃ 9.63 is
large, and good bandit information can be obtained with Innovate.
C: (nI , pc) = (1, 0.2). pc is large, and the bandit information changes fre-
quently. As nI = 1, it is difficult to obtain good bandit information with
Innovate.
D: (nI , pc) = (10, 0.2). pc is large, as in C. As nI = 10, good bandit infor-
mation can be obtained with Innovate.
2.3 Experimental procedure
The experiment reported here were conducted at the Information Science
room at Kitasato University. The subjects included students from the university,
mainly from the School of Science. The number of subjects S was 67. Each
subject participated in the game at most four times.
The subjects entered a room and sat down on a chair. After listening
to a brief explanation about the experiment and reward, they signed a consent
document for participation in the experiment. Afterwards, they logged into the
experiment website using the IDs written on the consent document. The game
environment was chosen among the four cases A, B, C, and D, and they started
their games. After 100 + 3 rounds, the game ended. The subjects logged into
the website again to participate in a new game. Within the allotted time of
approximately 40 min, most subjects participated in the game at least three
times. Subjects were paid upon being released from the experiment.
There were slight differences in the experimental setup and rewards
among the subjects. For the first 21 subjects (July 2014), there was no par-
ticipation fee. The reward was completely determined by the number of times
that they entered the Top 20 among the 120 + 1 entrants in each game. Their
rewards were a prepaid card of 300 yen (approximately $2.50) for each placement
within the Top 20. The subject could choose the game environment at the start
of the game. They could choose each environment at most once, and the aver-
age number of subjects in each environment is approximately 19. They did not
know the parameters of each environment. For the last 46 subjects (December
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2014) there was a 1050 yen (approximately $9) participation fee in addition to
the performance-related reward. The reason for the change in the reward is to
recruit more subjects. They were asked to play the game at least three times
during the allotted time. The game environment was randomly chosen by the
experimental program. The average number of subjects in each environment is
approximately 37. A total of 67 subjects participated in the experiment, and we
gathered data from approximately 56 subjects for each game environment.
§3 Optimal strategy and swarm intelligence ef-
fect
We estimate the expected payoff of the optimal strategies for the player
in the rMAB game. Here, optimal means to maximize the expected total payoff
in a total of 100 + 3 rounds. For the first three rounds (t ∈ {−2,−1, 0}), the
player could choose Innovate or Observe. After that, he could choose all three
options. The optimal choice for round t is defined as the choice that maximizes
the expected payoff obtained during the remaining T − t rounds.
We assume that the player has the complete knowledge about the rMAB
game. More concretely, he knows pc, E(s), and E(sI) about the rMAB. Further-
more, he knows the bandit information exploited during the previous round. We
denote the average value of the payoff of the exploited bandit at round t − 1
as O(t). If the player chooses Observe for round t, the expected value of the
payoff of the obtained bandit information is O(t). O(t) depends on the agents’
choices in the background. It is usually the most difficult quantity to estimate
for the player in the game, as it depends on the strategies of the agents. With
this information, we estimated the expected value of the payoff per round for
the remaining rounds for each choice.
We assume that there are M pieces ofbandit information in the player’s
repertoire at round t. We denote them as (nm, sm, tm),m ∈ {1, · · · ,M}. Here,
tm is the round during which the player obtained the information. When, the
player obtains information from Innovate or obtains updated information from
Exploit at t′, tm = t
′. If the player obtains information from Observe at t′,
tm = t
′− 1, as Observe returns the bandit information from the previous round,
t′ − 1.
We denote the expected value of the payoff per round for exploiting
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bandit nm from t to T as Em(t). This quantity is estimated as
Em(t) = E(s) +
1
T − t+ 1
T∑
t′=t
(sm − E(s))(1 − pc)
t
′
−tm
= E(s) +
(1 − (1− pc)
T−t+1)(sm − E(s))(1 − pc)
t−tm
pc(T − t+ 1)
(1)
where (1−pc)
t
′
−tm is the probability that the bandit information does not change
from tm until t
′. During this period, the payoff is sm. If the bandit information
changes until t′, the probability for it is 1−(1−pc)
t
′
−tm , and the expected payoff
of the bandit is given by E(s). By summing these values and dividing by the
number of rounds T − t+ 1, we obtain the above expression.
We denote the expected payoff per round for Innovate as I(t). For Inno-
vate, a player does not receive any payoff. He only obtains bandit information,
and the expected value of the payoff of the obtained bandit information is E(sI).
We estimate the expected value of the payoff by Innovate by assuming that the
player continues to exploit the new bandit with the payoff E(sI) from round t+1
to T as
I(t) =
T − t
T − t+ 1
E(s)+
(1− (1 − pc)
T−t)(E(sI)− E(s))(1 − pc)
pc(T − t+ 1)
.(2)
As the player loses one round because of Innovate, the prefactor in front of E(s)
and the power of (1−pc) are reduced to (T−t)/(T−t+1) and (T−t) as compared
with those in eq.(1). If nI = 1, E(sI) = E(s), the second term vanishes, and
Innovate is almost worthless. For cases in which all of the payoffs of the bandit
information in one’s repertoire are zero or less than E(s), it might be optimal to
choose Innovate. Otherwise, instead of losing one round and obtaining bandit
information with a payoff E(s), it is optimal to choose Exploit with the maximum
expected payoff. If pc is large, even if all the payoffs in one’s repertoire is zero,
(1− pc)
t−tm can be negligibly small, and it is optimal to choose Exploit. When
nI > 1 and pc are not very large, Innovate might be optimal.
Likewise, we estimate the expected payoff per round for Observe, which
we denote as O(t). For Observe, a player obtains bandit information with a
payoff O(t). The age of the information is one round older than the information
obtained by Innovate. We change E(sI) to O(t) in eq.(2). Accounting for the
age of the new bandit information, we estimate O(t) as
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O(t) =
T − t
T − t+ 1
E(s)+
(1− (1− pc)
T−t)(O(t)− E(s))(1 − pc)
2
pc(T − t+ 1)
.(3)
Comparing I(t) and O(t), which is more optimal depends on pc and E(sI)−O(t).
If pc is small and 1 − pc ≃ 1, the magnitude of the relationship between E(sI)
and O(t) determines which is more optimal.
The optimal strategy is to choose the action with maximum expected
payoff during every round t ∈ {−2,−1, · · · , T = 100}. For example at t = T ,
the last round of the game, as I(T ) = O(T ) = 0 holds, it is optimal to choose
Exploit for bandit m with the maximum Em(T ). In the first three rounds where
the player can choose only Innovate or Observe, if both pc and nI are small,
E(sI) < O(t) usually holds. Observe is more optimal than Innovate in this
case. The situation is the same in later rounds, and the optimal strategy is a
combination of Exploit and Observe. Conversely, if both pc and nI are large,
even if O(t) ≃ E(sI), (1− pc) < 1 and I(t) > O(t) hold.
We estimate the expected payoff per round for several “optimal” strate-
gies with a restriction on the choice of learning. We consider three strategies,
and an Exploit-only strategy as a control strategy.
• I+O: The player can choose both Innovate and Observe when learning.
In the first three rounds, Innovate is chosen. Then, the action with the
highest expected payoff is chosen in the later rounds.
• I: The player can choose Innovate for learning. The other conditions are
the same as I+O.
• O: The player can choose Observe for learning. The other conditions are
the same as I+O.
• EO: The player can choose Exploit with the maximum expected payoff
after the first three rounds.
The expected payoffs per round for these strategies are written as I+O, I, O,
and EO, respectively. We also denote the expected payoff per round for agent i
as P(i). They are estimated by a Monte Carlo simulation. We have performed
a simulation of a game in which 120 agents and four players with above strate-
gies participate 104 times. As we have explained in the experimental procedure,
the agents cannot observe the bandit information exploited by the player. Only
player can observe the bandit information of the agents. As there is no interac-
tion between the players, we can estimate the expected payoffs of the four players
simultaneously. In the experiment, the player can choose Observe for the first
three rounds. With the above strategies, the player can choose Innovate only
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Fig. 3 Optimal learning in (nI , pc). The thick solid line shows the boundary between the
region I>O and the regionO>I. The dotted line shows the boundary beyond which EO≃I+O.
for simplicity. The players and agents compete on equal terms.
We summarize the results in Figure 3. In (nI , pc) plane, we show which
strategy is more optimal, I or O. The thick solid line shows the boundary where I
=O. In the lower-left regionO>I holds. As nI and pc are small, the relationship
O(t) > E(sI) holds, and Observe becomes a optimal learning method. In the
upper-right region, I > O holds. nI is large, and E(sI) is greater than or
comparable to O(t). As pc is large, the one round delay for exploiting the
bandit information obtained by Observe might be crucial. The thin dotted line
shows the boundary beyond which I+O is comparable with EO. As pc is large,
the player can obtain comparable payoffs by only exploiting a good bandit in
his repertoire. There is neither an exploitation–extrapolation trade-off nor a
social–asocial learning trade-off above the dotted line. It is a noise-dominant
region.
One can understand why there is no social–asocial learning trade-off in
Rendell’s tournament 10). In the tournament, they set nI = 1 and nO ≥ 1. Here,
nO is the amount of bandit information obtained by Observe. If nI = 1, as we
have explained previously, E(sI) = E(s) holds. If pc is small, O(t) is usually
greater than E(s), as agents exploit the good bandit in their repertoire. Then,
an agent can obtain good bandit information by Observe, and Observe becomes
an optimal learning method. If pc is too large, instead of trying to obtain
good information with Innovate, it is optimal to wait spontaneous changes in
the bandit information in the repertoire. Exploiting a good bandit in one’s
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repertoire (EO strategy) is enough, and no other strategy cannot exceed the
performance of EO.
In the region where O>I and I+O>EO, social learning is effective, and
a swarm intelligence can emerge. We define the swarm intelligence effect as the
increase in the performance compared to I. In the next section, we estimate the
swarm intelligence effect for human subjects. As for the choice of (nI , pc), we
have studied four cases A:(1,0.1), B:(10,0.1), C:(1,0.2), and D:(10,0.2). We show
the positions for these choices in figure 3. For cases A and C, O >>I, and one
expect to observe the swarm intelligence effect in human subjects. For cases B
and D, where O≃I and O<I, one does not expect to observe it.
We make a comment about the definition of the swarm intelligence effect.
For the estimation of I, we assume that the player knows pc, E(s), and E(sI)
and can choose the best option among Exploit and Innovate. The player has
to estimate this information from his actions in the real game. If the player
cannot choose Observe, his performance cannot exceed I. The definition of the
swarm intelligence effect only provides a lower limit. Toyokawa 12) defined it as
the surplus in performance compared to when the same player can only choose
Innovate. Our definition has the advantage that it can be estimated easily
without performing an experiment. The same reasoning applies to I+O. In this
case, the player knows everything that is related with his decision making. I+O
provides an upper limit on the performance of the player in the game.
§4 Experimental results
In this section, we explain the experimental results. We estimate the
swarm intelligence effect for human subjects. We perform a regression analysis
of the performance of each subjects in each experimental environment.
4.1 Swarm intelligence effect
We calculated the total payoff of each subject for 100+3 rounds in each
game environment. We divided the total payoff by 100 and obtained the average
payoff per round. For each game environment, we estimated the average value
of the average payoffs per round for approximately 56 subjects and denote it as
H. This represents the average performance of human subjects in each case. We
compare H with I+O, I, O, and P(i) for agent i. Figure 4 show the results for
cases A, B, C, and D. We explain the results of each case.
A: Case A is in the region where where O>I, and Observe is optimal for
Interactive Restless Multi-armed Bandit Game and Swarm Intelligence Effect 13
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B: pc=0.1,nI=10
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C: pc=0.2,nI=1
P(i)
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I=3.3
O=7.0
H=5.2
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D: pc=0.2,nI=10
P(i)
I+O=9.6
I=9.2
O=8.4
H=6.7
Fig. 4 Plots of P(i)(✷), I+O(◦), I(•), O(△) and H(×). A:(pc, nI) = (0.1, 1), H(54)=
8.0 ± 0.6. B:(pc, nI) = (0.1, 10), H(65)= 11.1 ± 0.5. C:(pc, nI) = (0.2, 1), H(54)= 5.2 ± 0.3.
D:(pc, nI) = (0.2, 10), H(52)= 6.7 ± 0.3. The number in each parentheses is the number of
subjects in each case.
learning. As I+O≃O and O is much greater than I, one can expect the
swarm intelligence effect. In fact, H, which is plotted with a chain line,
is higher than I. For a fixed value of c, P(i) increases with pobs. For the
dependence of P(i) on c for a fixed value of pobs, there is a maximum for
some c. For pobs = 0.0, P(i) is maximum at c ∼ 4. For pobs = 0.9, P(i)
is maximum at c ∼ 8.5. The agent can obtain good bandit information
by Observe, and they had better to adopt large c.
B: Case B is in the region where O>I. However, it is near the boundary for
I = O, and the difference between O and I is small. One cannot expect
the swarm intelligence effect. In fact, H is below I. As I≃O, subjects
could not improve their performance by Observe. One see I+O>O, and
the difference between I+O and O is small. As nI = 10 is large, Innovate
is frequently more optimal than Observe. For example, if an agent finds
that the payoff of good bandit information changes to zero in round t
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by Exploit, one can suspect that Observe does not provide good bandit
information. In particular, if the bandit is good, and the payoff is high,
one can assume that many agents also exploited the bandit. Then Observe
should provide bandit information with zero payoff in round t+ 1 with a
high probability.
P(i) is an increasing function of pobs when c is small. When c is large,
P(i) does not depend on c very much. When c is small, agents can
easily obtain bandit information whose payoff is greater than c. Then,
the agent exploits the not so good bandit. On the other hand, if the
agent obtains bandit information by Observe, he can obtain good bandit
information, as the bandit’s payoff exceeds the other agents’ c. Observe
is more optimal than Innovate when c is small. However, when c is large,
the agent can obtain good bandit information by Innovate, as nI is large.
By Observe, the agent can obtain good bandit information, and there is
not a big difference in the performance of I and O. As a result, P(i) does
not depend very much on pobs when c is large.
C: Case C is in the region whereO>I. I+O≃O, andO is much greater than
I, as with case A. One can observe the swarm intelligence effect because
H is greater than I. Because pc is large, the expected payoffs and average
payoff of the subjects are lower than those for case A.
D: Case D is in the region where I>O, and Innovate is optimal for learning.
As I+O>I, Observe is optimal in some cases. When c is large, P(i)
is a decreasing function of pobs. As both pc and nI are large, instead
of obtaining good bandit information by Observe, Innovate succeeds in
obtaining new and good bandit information. When c is small, as in case B,
the agent can obtain better bandit information by Observe than Innovate.
One cannot observe the swarm intelligence effect, as in case B.
4.2 Regression analysis of the performance of individual
subjects
We perform a statistical analysis of the variation in the payoffs of the
subjects in the four cases. We examined the factors that made strategies suc-
cessful by using a linear multiple regression analysis. In Rendell’s tournament,
there were five predictors in the best-fit model for the performance of the strate-
gies 10). Among them, we considered three predictors: rlearn, the proportion of
moves that involved learning of any kind; robs, the proportion of learning moves
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that were Observe; and ∆tlearn, the average round between learning moves.
Other predictors were the variance in the number of rounds to first use of Ex-
ploit and a qualitative predictor of whether or not the agent program estimates
pc. For the latter, we suppose that human subjects estimated pc, or they could
notice whether the frequency of the change in bandit information is high or low.
For the former predictor, it is impossible to estimate it, as the subjects partic-
ipated in the game at most once for each case. We do not include these two
predictors in the regression model. We denote the average payoff per rounds
for subject j as payoff(j). The multiple linear regression model is written as
payoff(j) = a0+a1 ·rlearn(j)+a2 ·robs(j)+a3 ·∆tlearn(j). We select the model
with maximum R˜2. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1 Parameters of the linear multiple regression model predicting the average payoff
per round in each game environment. From the second to fourth columns, the intercepts
and regression coefficients for rlearn, robs, and ∆tlearn are shown. n.s. for p > 0.05,* for
p < 0.05,** for p < 10−2,*** for p < 10−3 and **** for p < 10−4.
Case Intercept rlearn robs ∆tlearn R˜
2
A(53) 10.0 (****) -11.0(**) 3.3 (p = 0.16) n.s. 0.253
B(65) 14.1 (****) -10.7 (*) n.s. n.s. 0.076
C(54) 8.37 (***) -8.2 (**) 3.0 (*) -0.49 (p = 0.06) 0.186
D(52) 8.7 (****) -7.2 (**) 1.4 (p = 0.23) n.s. 0.144
ALL(224) 12.0 (****) -13.8 (****) 1.3 (p = 0.15) n.s. 0.246
rlearn had a negative effect on the performance of the subjects, as in
Rendell’s tournament. This result suggests that it is suboptimal to invest too
much time in learning, as one cannot obtain any payoffs for learning. For robs,
the results are not consistent with the results of Rendell’s tournament. There,
the predictor had a strong positive effect, which reflected the fact that the best
strategy was to almost exclusively choose Observe rather than Innovate. In our
experiment, the predictor seems to have a positive effect for cases A, C, and
D. For cases A and C, it is consistent with the results in the previous section
because O>I, and Observe is more optimal than Innovate. In case D, as H is
much less than both I andO, obtaining good bandit information from the agents
by Observe might improve the performance.
§5 Conclusion
16 Shintaro Mori
In this paper, we attempt to clarify the optimal strategy in a two trade-
offs environment. Here, the two trade-offs are the trade-off of exploitation–
exploration and that of social–asocial learning. For this purpose, we have devel-
oped an interactive rMAB game, where a player competes with multiple agents.
The player and agents choose an action from three options: Exploit a bandit,
Innovate to obtain new bandit information, and Observe the bandit information
exploited by other agents. The rMAB has two parameters, pc and nI . pc is the
probability for a change in the environment. nI is the scope of exploration for
asocial learning. The agents have two parameters for their decision making, pobs
and c. pobs is the probability for Observe when the agents learn, and c is the
threshold value for Exploit.
We have estimated the average payoff of the optimal strategy with some
restrictions on learning and complete knowledge about rMAB and the bandit
information exploited during the previous round. We consider three types of
optimal strategies, I+O, I, and O, where both Innovate and Observe, Innovate,
and Observe are available. In the (nI , pc) plane, we have derived the strategy
that is more optimal, either O or I. Furthermore, we have defined the swarm
intelligence effect as the surplus of the performance of I. The estimate of the
swarm intelligence effect provides only a lower bound for it; however, the es-
timation is easy and objective. We also point out that the swarm intelligence
effect can be observed in the region of the (nI , pc) plane whereO is more optimal
than I. We have performed an experiment with 67 subjects and have gathered
approximately 56 samples for the four cases of (nI , pc). If (nI , pc) are chosen
in the region where O is far more optimal that I, we have observed the swarm
intelligence effect. If (nI , pc) are chosen near the boundary of the two regions
or in the region where I is more optimal than O, we did not observe the swarm
intelligence effect. We have performed a regression analysis of the performance
of each subject in each case. Only the proportion of learning is the effective
factor in the four cases. In contrast, the proportion of the use of Observe for
learning is not significant.
As the agent’s decision making algorithm is too simple, it is difficult to
believe that the conditions for the emergence of the swarm intelligence in Figure
3 are general. In addition, the analysis of the human subjects is too superficial,
as we only studied the correlation between the performance and some predictive
factors. With these points in mind, we make three comments about future
problems.
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The first one is a more elaborate and autonomous model of the de-
cision making in an rMAB environment. The algorithm needs to estimate
pc,E(s),E(sI), and O(t) for round t on the basis of the data that the agent
has obtained through his choices. Then, the agent can choose the most optimal
option during each round and maximize the expected total payoff on the basis
of these estimates. This is an adaptive autonomous agent model. With this
model, we can understand the decision making of humans in the rMAB game
more deeply. It is impossible to understand human decision making completely
with experimental data. On the basis of the model, we can detect the deviation
in human decision making and propose a decision making model for a human
that can be tested in other experiments.
The second one is the collective behavior of the above adaptive au-
tonomous agents or humans. It is necessary to clarify how the conditions for the
emergence of the swarm intelligence effect would change. In the case of a popu-
lation of adaptive autonomous agents, they would estimate the optimal value of
pobs for the environment (nI , pc) and collectively realize the optimal value. The
optimal strategy should be neither I nor O but a mixed strategy of Innovate and
Observe. Then, the condition for the emergence of the swarm intelligence effect
is that the performance of I+O is equal to that of I. If the performance of the
former is greater than that of the latter for any (nI , pc), the swarm intelligence
effect can always emerge, except for the noise-dominant region. After that, we
can study the conditions with human subjects experimentally. A human subject
participates in the rMAB game as a player, as in this study, or many human
players participate in the game to compete with each other. The target is how
and when humans collectively solve the rMAB problem.
The third one is the design of an environment in which swarm intelli-
gence works. In this study, we choose the rMAB interactive game and study
the conditions for the emergence of the swarm intelligence effect for a player.
However, there are many degrees of freedom in the design of the game. For
example, when an agent observes, there are many degrees of freedom regarding
how bandit information is provided to the agent. In the present game environ-
ment, the probability that a bandit exploited in the previous round is chosen
is proportional to the number of agents who have exploited it. Instead, we can
consider an environment in which the bandit information of the most exploited
bandit is provided, the bandit information of the agents who are near the agent is
provided, or the player can choose a bandit by showing him the number of agents
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who have exploited the bandit. We think these changes should affect the choice
and performance of the player. It was shown experimentally that by providing
subjective information about a bandit, the performance of the subjects dimin-
ished 12). We think that the interaction between the design of the environment
and the decision making, performance, and swarm intelligence effect should be a
very important problem in the industrial usage of the swarm intelligence effect.
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